



#### Will EMR work?

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## Overview

- What does 'work' mean?
- Conflicting goals in EMR and what they imply
- A crowded landscape, policy change and conflicting ideologies in UK energy policy
- The key challenge: Galvanising investment
- Who are the investors?
- Can EMR help?
- Conclusions ...no cigar

# What does 'work' mean (or how might we judge if EMR worked)?

- The govt view of 2030\*
  - Over 1/3 power from REs, nuclear established, CCS 'widely deployed'
  - Power largely decarbonised, more secure, less fossil
  - New entry eased, costs falling
  - consumers active, effective demand-side action
- Should we add?
  - A more robust ETS?
  - Enough new CCGT to avoid a 'capacity gap'?
  - A UK industrial base?
  - The Daily Mail assuaged?

<sup>\*</sup> EMR White Paper Box 1

## Goal conflict 1. fairness or investment?

- 'Making the existing market fairer'\*:
  - to consumers, who want investment to take place in the most cost effective way
  - to low-carbon generators... at a natural disadvantage
  - to new entrants, who struggle to sell their electricity in a market dominated by six big firms
- Ensure investment 'at the required pace' to\*\*:
  - 'ensure the future security of electricity supplies;
  - decarbonise... electricity generation; and
  - minimise costs to the consumer'

\*EMR WP, Foreword

\*\*EMR WP, Chapter 1



# Goal conflict 2. New entry and new tech – why, what and how?

- Is new entry a goal in itself?
- Who are the new entrants?
  - Financial Investors e.g. Institutional Investors
  - Strategic Investors e.g. Energy and Supply chain co's
  - Small players e.g. small companies, community schemes
  - The public?
- Which technologies do we really (really) want?
  - One size fits all but some sizes fit better than others, is the priority nuclear, big RE, small RE, or CCS?



# Hence a wide range of challenges

- Fill the capital gap created by limits on the big 6, both balance sheet and geared, to deliver £110b\*
- Create a realistic investment case for new nuclear
- Reduce cost of capital for all low carbon generation
- Encourage new entrants, big and small
- Reform the RO to reduce complexity, price risk, costs
- Assure and accelerate progress to 2020 RE targets
- Build peaking plant as/if needed to sustain margins
- Encourage more demand side action
- Mobilise consumers

<sup>\* £75</sup>b in new generation, EMR WP, Chapter 2

# A crowded landscape – ideological conflict and short term uncertainty

#### Economic idealism vs technology pragmatism Short term uncertainty

- FiTs and obligations undesirable distortions only tolerated until carbon is priced
- FiTs and obligations are investable, cost effective, efficient means to beget learning
- Policy should always be technology neutral and avoid 'picking winners'
- Policy must target technologies Why not pick winners?
- CPS is the centrepiece of EMR. Not perfect but a step in the right direction
- FiTs are the centrepiece of EMR. Not perfect but a step in the right direction
- FiTs are a distortion and a distraction
- The CPS is tax, irrelevant to investment, damaging to consumer acceptance
- The EPS is irrelevant We agree!

- **Electricity Market Reform** 
  - FiTs/CPS/EPS/Capacity Payment
  - Overlap, interaction, opposition
- Renewable Obligation Banding Review
- Ofgem Retail Market Review
- Proposed Green Investment Bank
- National Infrastructure Plan

# Investment: the real challenge

#### What do we need?

- £75b required for new gen capacity to 2020\*
- £40b alone for offshore wind ?\*\*
- Current big 6 spend around £5b/year (already a stretch, see below)
- Dash for gas was about £11b total
- Total market value of all existing UK generation plant is c. £50b\*\*\*
- Huge plans for economic infrastructure at UK, EU and global level
- UK policy/investment environment attractive vs peers?



## Investment: the issues

### Why can't the big six deliver?

- Already historically high capex plans
- Scale of investment required too large
- Balance sheets constrained
- Limited ability to raise new debt or equity

#### Who are the other possible investors?

- Energy/ Utilities including oil/gas firms (especially part state owned)?
- Supply Chain OEMs and big engineering firms; independent and foreign developers?
- Financial Investors pension funds, insurance co's, sovereign wealth funds and banks (including Asian development and export support banks)?
- Expanded ownership Joe public, start up companies, community groups?



# Pension and insurance funds: really?

#### Long term option not short term solution

- Infrastructure as a small allocation of investors portfolio
- Renewables as a subset of infrastructure
- Skills, competence and conservatism
- Technology risks real and perceived
- Regulatory risks in a policy driven market
- Currency diversification
- Need for standardised products?



# From short term to long: What is important?

- Enabling effective build consortia; both cash and skills rich, who can share risks to allow finance & build of major projects
- 2. Enabling (eventual) refinancing at low risk rates

#### Hence

- Administrative simplicity and clarity pre-investment
- Institutional/counterparty credibility
- Real liquidity OR volume obligation
- Avoiding new risks e.g. off-take, policy interaction
- Maintaining political credibility 'believability gap'
- Transitional arrangements that avoid hiatus

# Beyond EMR – policy, institutions and finance?

- Public finance institutions key in offshore wind finance elsewhere in Europe
  - Both as source of capital and risk transferral
- Similar role required of GIB in short term to stimulate build stage RE financing in UK?
- GIB required to catalyse refinancing / secondary market for RE assets?

# Conclusions: No cigar yet

- Short term impact on investment marginal/negative
- Long term impact positive but not overwhelmingly so
- Fundamental issue trying to serve multiple objectives, not just the finance barrier
- Not helped by diversity of stakeholder views/preconceptions
- Substantial changes to the policy landscape mean delays inevitable
- Perceived regulatory risks remain large
- Institutional investment unlikely to be sizeable in short term
- A step change in investment could be driven more by public financial intervention rather than regulatory or market reform
- EMR is fine as far as it goes, but a far reaching review of the investment proposition is a greater need, both now and in future