

Understanding Gazprom

- a doctrinal perspective

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Significance



Significance of Gazprom is obvious to all

- if not before Jan '06, then certainly now
- huge amounts of gas + money at stake
 - and European energy security-of-supply




But often approached with considerable naïvety ...

The puzzle



- 2006: Gazprom pursuing initiatives in 41 countries!
- requires enormous management bandwidth etc:
- how is this possible? Needs careful explanation
- and what does it mean?



Answers?



Some partial explanations

- Gazprom now an active part of Russian state apparatus, resources:
 - nash dom, Gazprom
- activities are not all substantive
- activities do not require major resources (esp cash others will pay !)
- everyone desperate to do business with Gazprom
- easier for Gazprom than for western companies kto kovo?

All contain important insights:

- but don't fully explain the management bandwidth issue
- and need to be understood in strategic context

Another angle



Use of military-doctrinal perspective

- military jargon all too common in business, often unsatisfactory
- used here NOT as casual metaphor, but as precise parallel

Particularly interesting in Gazprom's case

- Russian doctrine well-developed, openly debated
- history of success (by its own lights, on its home ground)
- many Russian energy strategists likely to be wholly conversant

Also – Russians often much better at it than western businessmen!

Doctrine



Backdrop: vast, open expanse of steppes

- contrast with more varied western topography
- leads to emphasis on 'chess' problem:
 - how to prevail when everything is obvious to both sides?

First doctrinal point:

No such thing as strategic surprise – so must create tactical surprise


Immediate application:

No surprise when Russia leverages resource-base uncompromisingly

- see Sakhalin & NordStream this week!
- but expect many tactical surprises (e.g. Ukraine ...)

No surprise ...






Precepts



- use of depth / thinking in 4-D
- project into opposing rear areas
- multiple, simultaneous axes
- speed, to 'condition the battlefield'
- manœuvre resources to maximise
- firepower, through coordination
- 'fix and by-pass' resistance
- abandon first-echelon forces
- end coalition after early usefulness
- drive wedge between JV partners
- disguise true intent 'maskirovka'

Precepts - & practice






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- LNG swaps
- downstream; finance; tech
- ... in 41 countries!
- LNG roll-out
- using others' cash
- the 'mega-agency'
- NEGP vs Bratsvo
- HydroWingas
- Ruhrgas
- Sakhalin
- NB!

Answers



What does it mean?

- at the highest level it's obvious a resources-based power play
- campaign of simultaneous advance on multiple axes is basic
- possible readings of 'opposing rear areas':
 - downstream margins
 - finance
 - technology

How is it possible?

- easier for Gazprom anyway
- coherent strategy brings efficiency
- firepower from coordination; maximisation from manoeuvre
- fix-and-bypass to avoid becoming mired
- maskirovka / feints: not everything is as it seems

Thinking ahead



What is real?

- follow the Gazprom \$
- maybe Gazprom hasn't fully decided yet

What surprises in store?

- think carefully about 'fix-and-bypass'
- watch for the concealed master-stroke

What should western companies & governments do?

take doctrine & strategy seriously!



Thank you

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