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HOUSEHOLD DEMAND, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT AND THE REBOUND EFFECTS

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Introduction

- UK Government encourages households environmental behaviour change and use of energy efficiency improvement measures at home (e.g. grants)
- The aim is to lower (direct and indirect) energy consumption and associated GHG emissions by households
- The expected reduction in energy consumption and GHG emissions might not be achieved due to rebound effects.





GHG intensity in 2004 (GHGs/f)



Expenditure share in 2013



GHGs share in 2013



Background

| Author | Region | Measure | Area | Metric | Energy/ emissions | Estimated rebound effect (%) |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Lenzen and Day | Australia | Efficiency & sufficiency | Food; heating | GHGs | Direct and embodied | 45-123% |
| Alfreddson | Sweden | Sufficiency | Food; travel; utilities | CO ₂ | Direct and embodied | 7-300% |
| Druckman et al | UK | Sufficiency | Transport, heating, food | GHGs | Direct and embodied | 7-51% |
| Thomas and Azevedo | US | Efficiency | Transport, electricity | Energy and CO ₂ | Direct and embodied | 7-25% |
| Murray | Australia | Efficiency & sufficiency | Transport, lighting | GHGs | Direct and embodied | 4–24% |
| Chitnis et al | UK | Efficiency | Heating, lighting | GHGs | Direct and embodied | 5–15% |
| Chitnis et al | UK | Efficiency and sufficiency | Transport, heating, lighting, food | GHGs | Direct and embodied | 5-106% |
| Brannlund et al | Sweden | Efficiency | Transport; utilities | CO ₂ | Direct and embodied | 120-175% |
| Mizobuchi | Japan | Efficiency | Transport; utilities | CO ₂ | Direct and embodied | 12-38% |
| Lin et al | China | Efficiency | Transport; utilities | CO ₂ | Direct and embodied | 37% |



Rebound effect for energy efficiency measures: GHGs emissions



Rebound model

$$\Delta G = u_s^X \Delta x_s^G + \sum_{i(i \neq s)} u_i^X \Delta x_i$$

$$\Delta G = u_s^x x_s \tau \eta_{q_s, p_s} + \sum_{i(i \neq s)} u_i^x x_i \tau \eta_{q_i, p_s}$$

$$\Delta H = u_s^x x_s \rho \qquad \qquad \tau = -\rho$$

$$R_T = \frac{\Delta G}{\Delta H} = (-\eta_{q_s, p_s}) - \sum_{i(i \neq s)} \psi_i \eta_{q_i, p_s}$$

where

 $\psi_i = \frac{u_i^x w_i}{u_s^x w_s}$

- u: GHG intensity
- x: expenditure
- q: quantity of demand
- s: relevant energy services
- i: other goods and services
- w: expenditure share
- ρ : % change in efficiency
- τ : % change in energy service price
- η : price elasticity



Rebound model

Using *Slutsky* equation, R_T is decomposed to substitution R_{SU} and income effects R_I : $R_T = R_{SU} + R_I$

$$\eta_{q_i,p_s} = \widetilde{\eta}_{q_i,p_s} - w_s E_{q_i,x}$$

 η_{q_i, p_s} Uncompensated price elasticity

 $\widetilde{\eta}_{q_{i},p_{s}}$ Compensated price elasticity

 $E_{q_i,x}$

Income elasticity

$$R_{T} = \left[w_{s} \eta_{q_{s},x} + (-\widetilde{\eta}_{q_{s},p_{s}}) \right] + \left[\sum_{i(i \neq s)} \psi_{i} w_{s} \eta_{q_{i},x} - \psi_{i} \widetilde{\eta}_{q_{i},p_{s}} \right]$$

Direct Indirect



Two stage budgeting model

Durable & non-durable goods & services



Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)

Stage 1:

$$w_{rt} = \alpha_r + \sum_s \gamma_{ij} \ln p_{st} + \beta_r \ln(x_t / P_t) + \sum_s \lambda_{rs} w_{s_{t-1}} + \varepsilon_t \qquad \text{r, s: 1, ..., 4}$$

where:

w_r=budget share of category r

P_s=price of category s

x=expenditure on durable & non-durable goods and services per household

P=Stone price index
$$ln P_t = \sum_r w_{rt} ln p_{rt}$$

Adding up:
$$\sum_{r} \alpha_{r} = 1, \sum_{r} \beta_{r} = 0, \sum_{r} \gamma_{rs} = 0, \sum_{r} \lambda_{rs} = 0$$

Symmetry: $\gamma_{rs} = \gamma_{rs}$

Homogeneity: $\sum_{r} \gamma_{rs} = 0$



Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)

Stage 2:

$$w_{it}^{r} = \alpha_{i} + \sum_{j \in r} \gamma_{ij} \ln p_{jt} + \beta_{i} \ln(x_{rt} / P_{rt}) + \sum_{j \in r} \lambda_{ij} w_{j_{t-1}} + \upsilon_{t} \quad i, j: 1, ..., n$$

where:

Homogeneity:

w_i=budget share of category i P_i=price of category j x_r=expenditure on category r per household P_r =Stone price index $ln P_{rt} = \sum w_{it} ln p_{it}$

-Adding up:

$$\sum_{i} \alpha_{i} = 1, \sum_{i} \beta_{i} = 0, \sum_{i} \gamma_{ij} = 0, \sum_{i} \lambda_{ij} = 0$$
-Symmetry:

$$\gamma_{ij} = \gamma_{ij}$$
-Homogeneity:

$$\sum_{i} \gamma_{ij} = 0$$

Estimation

- UK household annual time series data 1964-2013 obtained from Office for National Statistics (ONS)
- Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR) method for system estimation:
 - suitable for having restrictions on the model
 - ISUR will correct the estimation for any correlation of the residuals between the equations in the system.
- Unrestricted model is estimated and 'Wald test' is used for testing the restrictions. If the restriction is not rejected then the relevant restriction is imposed to the model. One equation is dropped in each group to satisfy the adding up restriction.



Wald test for symmetry and homogeneity restrictions

| Group | Durable and non-durable goods & services | Food & beverages | Transport | Energy | Other goods & services |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|--------|---------------------------|
| Symmetry | 33.5* | - | - | 5.4* | 41.4* |
| Homogeneity | 5.7 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 27.8* | 4.7 |
| Symmetry & Homogeneity | 45.4* | - | - | 27.8* | 58.3* |
| Symmetry based on Homogeneity | 39* | - | - | - | 53.2* |

* represents that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% probability level.



Elasticities for two-stage budgeting model (Edgerton 1997)

Within group elasticities:

Uncompensated price elasticity

Income elasticity

$$e_{rs} = \frac{\gamma_{rs} - \beta_r w_s}{w_r} - \delta_{rs}$$

 $E = 1 \pm \frac{\beta_r}{\beta_r}$

 δ_{rs} : Kronecker's delta equal to one when r=s and zero elsewhere.

Compensated price elasticity

$$\widetilde{e}_{rs} = \frac{\gamma_{rs}}{w_r} + w_s - \delta_{rs}$$

Total/between group elasticities:

Income elasticity

$$E_i = E_{(r)i}E_r$$

$$e_{ij} = \delta_{rs} e_{(r)ij} + E_{(r)i} w_{(s)j} [\delta_{rs} + e_{(r)(s)}]$$

$$\widetilde{e}_{ij} = \delta_{rs} \widetilde{e}_{(r)ij} + E_{(r)i} w_{(s)j} \widetilde{e}_{(r)(s)}$$

Estimated total elasticities

Uncompensated price elasticity

| Uncompensated price elasticity | Food & non- alcoholic beverages | Alcoholic beverages | Vehicle fuels | Other transport | Electricity | Gas | Other fuels | Recreation & culture | Restaurants & hotels | Education | Communication | Other |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------------|-------|
| Electricity | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.39 | 0.10 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| Gas | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.05 | -0.06 | 0.07 | -0.59 | 0.36 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| Vehicle fuels | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.59 | -0.001 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.16 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.02 |

Compensated price elasticity

| Compensated price elasticity | Food & non- alcoholic beverages | Alcoholic beverages | Vehicle fuels | Other transport | Electricity | Gas | Other fuels | Recreation & culture | Restaurants & hotels | Education | Communication | Other |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------------|-------|
| Electricity | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.39 | 0.11 | -0.08 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Gas | 0.03 | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.07 | -0.58 | 0.37 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Vehicle fuels | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.55 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

Income elasticity

| | Food & non- alcoholic beverages | Alcoholic beverages | Vehicle fuels | Other transport | Electricity | Gas | Other fuels | Recreation & culture | Restaurants & hotels | Education | Communication | Other |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|------|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------------|-------|
| Income elasticity | 0.71 | 0.88 | 1.01 | 1.33 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 1.22 | 1.15 | 1.23 | 1.06 | 1.01 |



Estimated rebound effects for average UK households (no capital cost, no embodied effect)



Rebound effect from direct and embodied emission



Direct and indirect rebound effects



Direct rebound

Indirect rebound

Discussion

- No backfire
- Rebound effect is relatively high and for domestic energy is larger than for vehicle fuels
- Direct emissions dominate the total rebound effect
- Rebound effects for electricity measures will increase over time as GHG intensity of electricity falls
- Assumptions are for UK average household
- Greater commodity disaggregation could give a different picture



- > Policy-makers need to take rebound into account when setting targets
- > Shift patterns of expenditure to lower GHG intensive goods and services







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