



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Financing a changing UK power sector

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Overview

- 1 The changing UK power market – problems facing investors**
- 2 Investment levels – past and future**
- 3 Policy design – impact on investor risks**
- 4 Next steps**



The UK electricity market faces significant long-run challenges



Fifth of existing fossil-fuel plant due to close over next decade



Long-run electricity demand could double by 2050



Weak price signals in the wholesale market for low-carbon generation



Need to create right incentives for low-carbon and flexible generation



Investment risks in low-carbon generation differ from those in fossil-fuel plant ...

- UK is **on target** to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in 2020, in line with carbon budgets and the EU
- From 2020, **further cuts in emissions from the power sector** are likely to be necessary to keep us on a cost-effective path to meeting our 2050 commitments
- Differences in cost structures between low-carbon and conventional generation, combined with price-setting role of flexible fossil-fuel plant, means that the **electricity price is more highly correlated with the costs of fossil-fuel plant**
- While **non price-setting plant** can benefit from increased input costs for price-setting plant, they are **exposed to lower fuel** prices that price-setting plant are not
- This **increases the risk of investment** in low-carbon capacity relative to investment in conventional capacity



... while more low carbon generation changes the economics of existing and new fossil-fuel plants

- Increasing evidence of **'missing money' problem** in energy-only market, may be mitigated by Ofgem plans on cash-out reform
- Likely **tighter future capacity margins and price spikes** in wholesale prices exacerbate perceived risk of 'missing money' among investors
- Two key factors increasing demand for flexible generating capacity:
 - **Increasing retirements** due to impact of environmental regulations on existing plants
 - **Increasing intermittency** on system as a result of increased wind and solar generation
- But remuneration for flexible capacity increasingly uncertain in future as it is increasingly **displaced in the merit order by low-carbon generation**
- Therefore, flexible plant will run less frequently and hence become increasingly **reliant on scarcity rents** at times of high demand/system stress to recoup costs




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The scale of future power sector investment requirements is considerable...





...but investment to date suggests we are
on track to meet challenging targets (£bn)

Source	Latest data	Actual investment	2010	2011	2012	2013 (YTD)
Generation		21.6	5.4	5.4	8.4	2.4
Renewables	2013 Q1	16.1	2.5	4.7	6.4	2.4
<i>Biomass</i>	<i>2013 Q1</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>0.1</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>0.5</i>
<i>Wind – onshore</i>	<i>2013 Q1</i>	<i>4.6</i>	<i>0.9</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>0.7</i>
<i>Wind – offshore</i>	<i>2013 Q1</i>	<i>6.2</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>3.0</i>	<i>1.0</i>
<i>Other</i>	<i>2013 Q1</i>	<i>3.8</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>0.3</i>
Non-renewables	2012	5.5	2.9	0.7	2.0	N/A
Networks		11.9	3.3	3.6	5.0	N/A
Distribution	2012	4.9	2.3	2.3	2.4	N/A
Transmission	2012	7.0	1.0	1.3	2.6	N/A
TOTAL		33.5	8.7	9.0	13.4	2.4



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EMR introduces a package of measures to increase certainty for investors

Contract for Difference

Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for Difference (CfD) will provide **long-term electricity price certainty** and **reduced revenue volatility**

Capacity Market

Capacity Market (CM) will convert **unpredictable scarcity rents** into more **predictable capacity payments**, helping to put adequate reliable capacity in place and protect consumers against the risk of supply shortages

Carbon Price Floor

The Carbon Price Floor (CPF) will provide **long-term certainty about the cost of carbon** in the UK electricity generation sector

Emissions Performance Standard

An Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) will provide further **certainty on the regulatory environment for fossil fuel plant** by providing clarity on the emissions cap from new non-abated thermal plants



CfDs offer significant potential for de-risking relative to current arrangements

Type of risk	Comparison with current arrangements	Impact on investor risk
Revenue variability	While off-take and forecasting/balancing risks remain with generators, long-term wholesale price risk is removed, stabilising revenues and helping reduce cost of capital	
Change in support levels	In contrast to the Renewables Obligation (RO), early certainty on allocation and price setting levels in the project development process.	
Credit risk	Although not tradable like RO, CfD counterparty will establish a framework of backstops to ensure CfD payments (e.g. collateral, mutualisation, Supplier of Last Resort/Energy Company Administration scheme)	-




CfDs offer significant potential for de-risking relative to current arrangements (cont'd)

Type of risk	Comparison with current arrangements	Impact on investor risk
Change in law	In contrast to RO, some contractual protection for both specific and discriminatory changes, and for general changes in law that have discriminatory effects without objective justification exists.	
Indexation	Annual RO price linked to RPI, CfD strike price fully indexed to CPI ; no material change in risk, with any differentials in inflation rates reflected in strike price	-
Refinancing	No change to current arrangements (no refinancing clause in CfD contract)	-
Duration	RO support provided for RO for 20 years (except biomass conversions), CfD support for 15 years (except biomass conversions); no clear net effect on risk, but differential support duration reflected in strike price	-



The levy control framework provides an affordability envelope and sighting to investors

Evolution of the Levy Control Framework (£bn, real 2012 prices)



Source: DECC

- The EMR package will allow the UK to meet its 2020 renewables and carbon budget targets
- Coalition government reached an agreement on the amount of support available to low carbon projects: £7.6bn (2011/12 prices) in 2020/21
- Long-term commitment and transparency on the amount of support available will ensure affordability and sustainability of the proposed measures



The capacity market is designed to reduce investor risks

- **Capacity market will help in turning scarcity rents into fixed capacity payments:** capacity market will allow resources to obtain fixed revenue stream rather than relying on scarcity rents in wholesale market.
- Helps **tackle perceived regulatory risk**, e.g. that government will intervene to prevent spiky prices in energy only market or regulator will investigate parties that price to recover fixed costs
- **OECD quote:** *“In the future, dispatchable technologies....will require that a portion of their revenues be derived from other sources than “energy-only” electricity markets if they are to stay in the market and provide the necessary back-up services. Capacity payments or markets with capacity obligations will play an important part in addressing this issue” (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, “Nuclear Energy and Renewables”).*



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We are working towards implementation in 2014

