



Modelling the New Model: The electricity wholesale market after the Helm Review

Richard Green

BIEE Seminar, 7 February 2018

This is a tidied-up, slightly edited, version of the slides presented at the seminar, with thanks to attendees for helpful suggestions. Use the mouse on the printed bubbles to see my comments

The Helm Review


A brief, selective, summary

- Complexity and winner-picking have increased costs
- Capacity auction (based on Equivalent Firm Power) is the most efficient way to meet security of supply
- Carbon tax (economy-wide, with border adjustment) is the most efficient way to meet carbon targets
 - Alternatively, add a carbon-constrained second stage to the capacity auction
- Network regulation should be reformed
 - System Operators would tender for many functions
- Suppliers should compete on a published supply margin and pass through all other costs transparently



Three technological trends


(mostly) Chapter 6 of the Review





Electricity Generation

Chapter 7 of the Review



The wholesale market

Chapter 7 of the Review

- Capacity costs will rise relative to running costs
- Much low-carbon output is effectively must-run
- Surplus output leads to zero or negative prices
- Intermittent wind and solar plant needs back-up
- Gas plants will see falling load factors
- Can costs be recovered in the energy market?



The EFP Auction

- Government / System Operator sets capacity target
- Generators offer Equivalent Firm Power

How do you define “EFP”?	“Central balancing”	“Self-balancing”
Generators sell:	De-rated capacity	Firm capacity
Back-up is contracted by:	System Operator	Generators




What could we expect in the wholesale market?

Principles of supply and demand

Demand and Supply

Prices reflect Marginal Costs






British Energy Prices


per MWh of electricity

£/MWh






Generator Costs & Revenues




Load-duration and Capacity






German Energy Prices: The Merit Order Effect





Demand and Supply


The merit order effect






Demand and Supply

The merit order effect






Capacity and Load





Generators' Load Factors

UK-wide, including Northern Ireland




Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics



Capacity and Peak Demand

Great Britain



Source: Digest of
UK Energy Statistics



Modelling the future

The energy market is here
for the long term...


A simple model

- Merit order stack with nuclear, biomass, CCGT, OCGT, diesel, load-shedding
- Costs based on 2016 BEIS Generation Cost Report and central fuel price projections for 2025
- Weather pattern of 2011 for demand and renewable output
- Autarkic GB system, with daily storage cycle
- Adjust capacity for (approximate) break-even and low amounts of load-shedding with a VOLL-linked price
- Cap the energy price at a lower level, and assume EFC auction revenues will fill the gap



Buying Capacity or Energy?


Share of equilibrium revenues from capacity auction





The shape of future prices?


Price-duration curve, given model assumptions





Generators' profit risk

Earlier work varying fuel prices




(the *positions* depend on particular cost assumptions; the *shapes* do not)



Optimal Portfolios

Given the previous risk profiles




Green,
Energy Journal,
2008



Optimal Portfolios

Optional Fixed-price, Long-term, Contracts



Green,
Energy Journal,
2008



What is electricity worth?

Some power stations are
more equal than others

Dimensions of power


-
- Hirth *et al.* (*Renewable Energy*, 2015) [doi:10.1016/j.renene.2014.08.065](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2014.08.065)
have differentiated electricity in terms of:
 - Time
 - Location
 - Lead Time
 - The most valuable power is typically produced:
 - When demand is high compared to supply
 - Geographically* close to consumption
 - With little or no notice

* In fact, electrically close, which may not be quite the same



Load duration curve for GB


2011 demand and weather with 5 GW solar PV





Load duration curve for GB


2011 demand and weather with 5 GW solar PV





Load duration curve for GB


2011 demand and weather with 20 GW solar PV





Load duration curve for GB

2011 demand and weather with 40 GW solar PV






PV and Relative Prices


Great Britain, May-July

Relative price





Output-weighted prices





What is the Equivalent Firm Capacity of Renewables?


2011 data only	Onshore Wind	Offshore Wind	PV
Annual Average Load Factor	27%	37%	10%
LF in top 1% of gross demands	27%	41%	1%
LF in top 1% of net demands	10%	13%	2%



What if we have an *Energy* Market?


How storage changes price-setting

A volatile market






A less volatile market



Source: Energinet.dk




Supply and Demand






Supply and Demand



Finn's bathtub, from Forsund (2007) *Hydropower Economics*, Springer




Reservoir Levels





Richard's bath-tub

Storage with generation




The maximum amount of storage is limited by its energy capacity (horizontal arrow) or the minimum price ratio ($P_2/P_1 > \text{efficiency}$)



Storage and price patterns

Indicative only



My reactions:

- Even with a lot of zero-MC plant, positive power prices will dominate returns to generators
- Power prices linked to gas are risky for renewables, and they won't get much more from an EFP auction
- Storage could start to affect price patterns, but you need high power *and* energy capacity relative to RES capacity



Over to you...

Thank you!